Explain a Kantian response to the amoralist.

Here are a couple postings from the professor to help with the review questions.

Reference: Chapter 11, David Hume, Morality and Sentiment. Please do the readings by Tuesday.. Read at least the summary boxes in this chapter. My own eLecture is below.
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David Hume is an empiricist. An empiricist is someone who believes
that all genuine knowledge of the outside world is based on
(or derived from or justified by) sensory experience. This is to be
contrasted with the position of a rationalist who believes that some
knowledge of the outside world is based on reason alone.

To remind you, here are the senses and the impressions we get
from them:

Sight—Visual impressions
Smell—Olfactory impressions
Touch—Tactile impressions
Taste—Gustatory impressions
Hear—Auditory impressions

For Hume, the objects of our minds are either impressions or ideas.
When we touch a hard surface for instance, we have the tactile
impression of a hard surface. When we try to remember the impression
at a later time, we end up with a copy of the original impressions.
These copies, Hume says, are ideas.

Note Hume’s point here that all ideas are derived from impressions.
In other words, there can be no idea without a corresponding
impression which precedes it. If so, what about complex ideas like
the idea of a unicorn (or superman)? Since we have no impression
of a unicorn, where does the idea come from? The idea of a unicorn,
Hume claims, is a combination of two simple ideas- a horse and a
horn- both of which are derived from impressions.

For John Locke, another empiricist, the human mind at birth is a
tabula rasa, a blank slate. Everything that gets written
on it is through experience. Thus, Hume and Locke seem to deny
that there are innate ideas- ideas that you are born with. They don’> t
believe that we have these ideas totally independent of our senses.

For Hume, our feelings/passions/desires/sentiments motivate us to act.
We do what we do because we have the relevant feelings/desires, not
because we recognize the rationality or reasonableness of the act. We
do things because we have feelings for what is going on or happening.
For Hume, Reason does not play any direct role in our act. He argues
that “reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” Hume is
thus claiming here the tradition of moral rationalism which dates back to
Socrates is grossly mistaken.

Consider an individual who is rich and very resourceful in many other ways.
Suppose that this individual lives in an area in which there is homelessness.
Suppose, too, that he knows about this social problem. These basic facts—
that the individual is rich, very resourceful, fully aware of a social problem—
are not by themselves sufficient to make him (or anyone else) want to
combat homelessness. Or so Hume argues; you need some relevant
sentiments to make the person act. Facts by themselves don’t make you
do anything.

Note that Hume’s point is that reason by its very nature cannot motivate
us to act. His point is not that reason may fail to motivate, but that it can
never do so. To be sure, once we have decided on what to do, say, combat
homelessness, reason can tell us how best to do the act. And, in general,
the more rational we are, the better off we are in that respect. But—and
this is the main point—our reason does not prefer one moral goal or aim to
another. The choice of a goal is a job for our passions.

Consider the following:

Smoking causes cancer in human beings.
Joe is a human being.
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C. Joe should not smoke.
C1. Reason ought to tell Joe not to smoke.
C2. It is rational for Joe not to smoke.

Or the following syllogism:

Spanking causes pain in little children.
Joe is a little child.
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C. Joe should not be spanked.
C1. Reason dictates that Joe should not be spanked.
C2. It is rational for Joe not to be spanked.

Hume argues that it is no more rational for Joe not to smoke than to smoke.
One course of action is no more reasonable than the other. If, say Joe has
a desire for longevity, then a specific action—not smoking—will become
more reasonable. That is, given the desire for longevity (to live long in
good health), Joe would be irrational to smoke. But it is the presence of a
desire that accounts for the rationality.

The general Humean point: Given the basic facts of a situation, Reason by
itself cannot give us an evaluation of the facts. There is no necessary
connection between certain basic facts and our evaluation. We consider an
action morally good if it invokes in us pleasurable feelings; otherwise, we
tend to consider the action bad. Likewise, we consider an action morally
bad if it invokes us repulsive feelings. But our feelings- pleasurable or
repulsive- are at the bottom of the evaluation.

Consider incest. To quote Hume, “The vice entirely escapes you as long as
you consider the object. You can never find it till you turn your reflection
into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in
you toward this action.”

Note that Hume does not consider morality completely autobiographical or
wholly subjective. There are objective elements to morality. Certain
actions—benevolent actions for example—invoke in most of us pleasurable
feelings. And certain other actions—killing an innocent person for fun for
instance—invoke in most of us aversions.

In conclusion, Hume locates the source of morality in our sentiments. We
are moved to act for the good of others by our sentiments, not our reason.
But most people have the appropriate feelings anyway. Thus, we are able to
provide a secure, seemingly objective foundation for morality.

http://www.yellowpigs.net/philosophy/hume

Many students find this particular topic difficult. It is not. Read carefully my discussions below. You will need to do so very slowly. The way I have it set up allows you to study Kant in the context of Hume’s views (which I assume you have read).

This is Chapter 12 of your textbook.

Please finish readings- first round of complete readings anyway- ASAP. There is a video link at the bottom of my e-Lecture. Watch the video. I show it in my brick-room version of this course. I have a power point presentation at the top of this piece. Read especially the first couple of slides, please. The slides help make clear the Kantian distinction between Acting from a sense of duty and Acting in accordance with duty.
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For Immanuel Kant, morality is based exclusively on reason. If you are truly
a rational person, you will be moral. Against the amoralist who wonders why
he should put his duty above his self-interest, a Kantian would reply that to
be amoral is to be irrational.

We might wonder why an amoralist might care
about being rational. Well, everybody cares about being rational; to be
irrational is to be completely outside of human discourse. Thus, IF it is true
that there is an internal link between morality and rationality, the amoralist,
indeed all of us, would have to be moral; we risk being irrational otherwise.

Kant is a nonconsequentialist. Ask him whether an act is moral, he would
ask you what kind of act it was: Does this act conform with certain
demands of rationality? He, unlike the Utilitarian, would Not ask you how
much general happiness (as well-being) is produced by doing it or any other
act. If the act conforms with the demands of rationality, then it is morally
permissible; otherwise, it is impermissible. A moral act here may, of course,
make people in general better off than they would have been. But this is
Not what makes the act moral.

It is traditional in texts to contrast John Stuart Mill’s theory with Kant’s. But
it is a lot more productive and perhaps historically accurate to contrast
Kant’s theory with David Hume’s. For Hume, all actions, including moral ones,
are based exclusively on passions (or desires or feelings). More
metaphorically, it is your heart that decides what you do. Reason plays No
role whatsoever in that. Imagine someone in your community who has
plenty of money and the know-how to eliminate homelessness from your
coomunity. Do these two facts by themselves guarantee that he would
actually eliminate homelessness? No, for Hume. This man must still have the
desire to do something about homelessness before he could act.

Having chosen solving homelessness as his goal, however, reason can guide
him to figure out the most efficient way to solve the problem. But reason
does Not choose the goals, his passion does. For Hume, one goal is just as
rational as another. In other words, one goal is only more rational than
another only in terms of how it is executed. On this view, a clever arsonist
may turn out to be mora rational that a moronic benefactor.

Consider the following simple syllogism:

1. Smoking causes cancer in human beings.
2. Joe is a human being.
Therefore, Joe should not smoke.

But many Joes at Triton do smoke. Maybe you are one of the Joes. Are you
irrational? A Humean explanation here would be that at this point in your
life, your desire for the pleasure of smoking overrides your desire for
longetivity. Perhaps some other desire is at work. What is clear to Humeans
is that it is not necessarily a case of deficiency in reason. Something is not
necessarily wrong with your thinking ability.

We have used Smoking to generate an example above. But it will still be the
same story if the syllogism had read:

1. Beating causes needless pain in human beings.
2. Joe, your enemy, is a human being.
Therefore, You should Not beat Joe.
What Hume denies is practical reasoning; he denies that reason, by itself,
can tell us what we should or should not do. Hume does not deny
theoretical reasoning: Given certain facts, concerns or assumptions, reason
can tell you what other facts ought to follow. And that is all it does here.

Kant, of course, affirms practical reasoning. Indeed, since morality is about
what we should or should not do, it is a form of practical reasoning. If
reason by itself can tell us what to do, and we are all rational, why then do
we end up doing different things anyway? For example, what does reason
tell us about polygamy? Euthanasia? A Kantian explanation might be that we
unwittingly allow our various biases and prejudices to influence us. If only
we could think purely as rational agents! If we could engage in pure
practical reasoning, that is, reason to what we should or should not do
without biases or prejudices, we would know what reason actually demands
that we do.

A way to practicalize what is involved in pure practical reasoning is through
the use of the veil of ignorance. (The veil is due to John Rawls, and we will
discuss it later after Virtue theory.) Imagine that you are not yet born.
think of yourself as a floating soul. You know that you will end up being born
in Chicagoland. And you know about the demographics of the various
neighborhoods and how they came about. But you do Not know your
particular characteristics. In particular, you do not know about your own
ethnicity, gender, wealth, social background, and IQ. All you know is that
you will end up in one of the neighborhoods with any combination of
background information. Now in this state of being a floating soul with
characteristics not yet determined, how would you want schools to be
funded? Would you want the government to guarantee that the quality of
education for everyone, no matter the neighborhood or circumstances of
parents, do not fall below a certain level even if the rich have to pay more
taxes? It is much easier with than without the veil of ignorance to get
consensus on this question!

Since we are Not purely rational, reason has to command us to do things
either categorically or hypothetically. When we are commanded
categorically, we have categorical imperatives, which we must follow no
matter our circumstances. We must do them willy- nilly. But when reason
commands us given the particular circumstances of an agent, we have
hypothetical imperatives. The command that we should not kill others for
fun is a categorical imperative. We cannot plead our way out of its
application to us. It would be silly, for example, to claim even if truthfully
that killing others for fun is the only fun that satisfies you. The rational
injunction that one should not run 25 miles on foot does not always apply.
For a runner getting ready for the marathon, that may be the best practice
for her. But for those trying to get to Gary, Indiana as fast as possible, it
would be completely irrational. It all depends on the corcumstances.

But what makes categorical imperatives categorical? It is The Categorical
Imperative, the underlying principle to all categorical imperatives. An
imperative, say, a moral rule, is categorical if and only if it conforms with
the Categotical Imperative. Kant has two formulations of the categorical
Imperative. Many people wonder if these are two different underlying
principles. For our purpose here, it is the same principle expressed in 2
different ways.

In the first formulation, we are to act only according to the maxim (or
principle) by which we can at the same time will to become a universal
principle. Let’s explain this with an example. Suppose that you go to a
grocery store. You take their goods and write them a bad check. We can
assume that the maxim of your action here is somewhat like the following:
Whenever convenient, I could violate property rights of others. Can you will
this principle as a universal principle? That is, would you want to live in a
society in which this is generally followed? Kant, of course, assumes that
you would say No. If so, then the action is morally impermissible.

The Universalizability Criterion in the first formulation can be expressed thus
in 2 questions:

1. What is the maxim/ principle of my action?
2. Would I want to live in a society in which that principle is generally
followed?
If No, then the action, say, writing a bad check, is morally impermissible.
You are then obligated Not to write a bad check. If Yes, then the action
may be morally permissible.

What Kant demands in this first formulation is that we behave like moral
legislators. You ask yourself: What if everyone were to behave like me, that
is, follow my example in similar circumstances but with me as a mere
member of the group? What if everyone were to do that? This is a poorly-
phrased question but it does capture the spirit of the first formulation.

The second formulation warns us Not to merely use others (and Not to allow
others to merely use us). We merely use others when in relating to them we
are able to satisfy our desires, needs and goals, but they are not able to
satisfy theirs. Note that Kant is Not saying that we should not use others.
We cannot but use others whether they are grocery clerks gas station
attendants or nurses. We have to use them to get what we want- food,
gas or health. But they should also be able to use us to get what they
want, say, money. But if you give the grocery clerk a bad check, you have
been able to get what you want without him getting what he wants. You
have thus used him as a mere means (to getting what you want), and not
as an end (someone with his own life projects and goals). Here is the
second formulation:

Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only.

http://student.thetablet.co.uk/kantian-ethics

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g08pZbIwnZo

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/

http://ethics.sandiego.edu/presentations/Theory/Ka…

http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i45/45b00701.htm

http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/matrawls.ht…

Rawls’ Theory of (Distributive) Justice

How do we share the benefits and burdens of a society? How much should a medical doctor earn? A lawyer? A professor? A sanitary inspector? A police officer? An athlete? A journalist? A soldier? A welfare recipient? Should there be compulsory military service? Should there be taxes? What tax rates would be fair? How should schools be funded? These are all questions about who gets what and why, and they are critical to the stability of a society. This is what distributive justice is all about.

A stable and healthy society is essential to the well-being of all its members. But a society is only as stable as long as its citizens are willing to meaningfully cooperate with each other. Why would a citizen want to willingly cooperate with others who do not necessarily care about him in particular? Justice; if a society is essentially just, citizens would be motivated to contribute to its social stability.

But what are the elements of a just society? One not-so-fruitful way is to go through all the elements- schools, courts, economy, etc- one by one. Another way is to figure out what ought to be the fundamental principles of association which guide a society in its development. These principles, of course, are to be considered fair by all and mutually advantageous to all its members. In other words, these principles would be rules which everybody genuinely wants and which rationally command their obedience.

How are these fundamental principles to be derived? Why would members of a society with their different agendas ever come to an agreement on anything, much less fundamental rules of association? Rawls wants the rules chosen in what he calls an original position of equality behind a veil of ignorance (This approach is motivated by Kant’s notion of pure practical reasoning, the idea that we can reason to what we ought to do without biases and prejudices.)

Putting on the veil requires that we bracket (become ignorant of) our social class, social status, intelligence, strength and stamina, emotional assets, health, ethnicity and nationality. Let me be more dramatic. Suppose that you are a floating soul; you are not yet born. But you know that you will end up in Chicago. You have no idea, however, your peculiar characteristics,
say, your ethnicity, social class, intelligence, gender, etc. Behind this veil of ignorance, you are to behave as a free, rational and self-interested person.

Now, how would you want schools to be funded? Would you agree to a minimum wage? Easy to see that it will be a lot easier for us to agree to a lot of conditions after putting on the veil.

Rawls contends that we would agree behind the veil to two fundamental principles of association, namely, the Equality Principle and the Difference Principle. The equality principle is about having equal basic liberty with others, and the difference principle explains conditions under which we might agree to social and economic inequalities.

The Equality Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

The basic liberties of citizens include political liberty (i.e., the right to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly; and liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.

The Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that: a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least- advantaged members of society, and b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

There is no requirement for sources or citations.